

2. SUMMARY AS THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE "GREAT [ILLEG] REVOLUTION OF APRIL 27-28, 1978 APPROACHES, THE CRITICAL LEVERS OF POLITICAL POWER IN THE REVOLUTIONARY DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN (DRA) -- THE CADRE OF THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF AFGHANISTAN (PDPA), THE MILITARY, AND THE SECURITY ELEMENTS OF THE BUREAUCRACY -- STILL APPEAR TO REMAIN LOYAL TO THE REGIME AS LONG AS THESE PRINCIPAL PILLARS DO NOT COLLAPSE OR BECOME SERIOUSLY WEAKENED, OUR PROGNOSIS -- AT LEAST IN THE SHORT TERM -- IS FOR THE DRA'S SURVIVAL, NONETHELESS, STRONG OPPOSITION STEMS FROM ANY NUMBER OF SOURCES, THE MOST SIGNIFICANT BEING THE WIDESPREAD PERCEPTION AMONG THE POPULACE THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS COMMUNIST, ATHEISTIC, AND UNDULY PRO-RUSSIAN, BELIEFS THAT STIR UP EXTREME HOSTILITY IN THIS DEVOUTLY MUSLIM AND TRADITIONALLY INDEPENDENT SOCIETY.

[SECOND COLUMN]

4. ROUGH SAILING UNDOUBTEDLY LIES AHEAD FOR THE KHALQIS BUT IF THE ESSENTIAL DOMESTIC EFFORTS OF THE DRA REMAIN LOYAL AND THE [WORDS ILLEG] AND ECONOMIC [ILLEG] AND IF [ILLEG] NECESSARY MILITARY INTERVENTION, A LEFTIST REGIME AT [ILLEG] COULD WELL REMAIN A FACT OF POLITICAL LIFE ON THE SOUTH ASIAN SCENE FOR SOME TIME TO COME. END OF SUMMARY.

PARTIAL TRANSCRIPTION - ORIGINAL FOLLOWS

[SECOND COLUMN]

9. THE ROLE OF AFGHANISTAN'S MULLAHS AND OTHER RELIGIOUS LEADERS HAS ALWAYS BEEN INFLUENTIAL IN TERMS OF THE INDIVIDUAL CITIZENS SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONDUCT. BECAUSE OF THE NATURE OF ISLAM'S SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE -- ALTHOUGH A PUBLICLY STATED GOAL OF THE KHALQIS -- HAS NOT BEEN A VIABLE CONCEPT HERE THUS FAR AND THIS REGIME'S RECENT PROTESTATIONS THAT IT IS MONITORING ONLY THE ACTIVITIES OF MULLAHS INVOLVED IN POLITICAL MATTERS ARE PROBABLY NOT BELIEVED BY INDIVIDUAL AFGHANS. GIVEN THE MULLAHS TRADITIONAL PARTICIPATION IN ALL SEGMENTS OF AFGHAN LIFE, THE REGIME'S STANCE MAY BE INHERENTLY SELF-DEFEATING, AND RECENT ARRESTS OF MULLAHS SUSPECTED OF OPPOSITION POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF SENTIMENTS CAN BE EXPECTED TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE CREATION OF LONG-TERM RESISTANCE ON THE PART OF AFGHANISTAN'S CLERICAL CLASS AND ITS SUPPORTERS.

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12. APART FROM THE OPPOSITION PROVOKED BY THE HATRED-OF-COMMUNISTS SYNDROME, SOME OF THE REFORMS INITIATED BY THIS REGIME HAVE ALSO ENGENDERED RELIGIOUSLY-FACED RESISTANCE DESPITE WHATEVER INHERENT ECONOMIC OR SOCIAL MERITS MANY GOVERNORS MAY SEE IN A [ILLEG] OF THESE PRGRAMS. GIVEN THE MUSLIM VIEW THAT ALL ASPECTS OF LIFE ARE INTERTWINED WITH ISLAM, MANY AFGHANS BELIEVE THAT THE REGIME'S REFORM PROGRAMS CONSTITUTE A REJECTION OF ACCEPTED MUSLIM MODES OF BEHAVIOR, RATHER THAN AN ATTEMPT TO OVERCOME ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL BACKWARDNESS.

13. ANIMOSITY TOWARD RUSSIANS STEEPED IN THE EXPERIENCES OF AFGHANISTAN'S HISTORY, ALSO PLAYS AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN CREATING OPPOSITION TO THIS PARTICULAR REGIME, AND THIS ANIMOSITY IS LIKELY TO INCREASE AS IT IS NOW GENERALLY BELIEVED THAT MOSCOW'S SUPPORT IS THE KEY PROP ENSURING THE DRA'S SURVIVAL. ANTI-SOVIET SENTIMENTS SURFACED DURING THE RECENT FIGHTING IN KERAT AS SOVIET ADVISORS WERE REPORTEDLY [ILLEG] OUT AS TARGETS OF THE ANTI-REGIME FORCES.

[SECOND COLUMN]

16. DISGRUNTLED LEFTISTS ESPECIALLY MEMBERS OF THE PARCHAM FACTION WHO HAVE BEEN PRINCIPAL VICTIMS OF THE KHALQI POLITICALLY-BASED FORCES COULD ALSO HARBOR DESIRE FOR REVENUE AND COULD ALSO REPRESENT ANOTHER POSSIBLE SOURCES OF ALTERNATE LEFTIST LEADERSHIP SHOULD THE [ILLEG]-AMIR TEAM COLLAPSE REVENUE, AN OMNIPRESENT FACTOR IN AFGHAN SOCIETY COULD ALSO MOTIVATE THE RELATIVES OF THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN ELIMINATED BY THIS REGIME -- EITHER THROUGH POLITICAL PURGES OR BY THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE SUCH AS IN THE RECENT FIGHTING IN HERAT -- AND OPPOSITION ACTIVITY AT SOME POINT [ILLEG] COULD TAKE ON THE COLORATION OF A COMPLETELY APOLITICAL BLOOD-FEUD WHICH, HOWEVER, COULD BE INDIVIDUALLY DEADLY AND WOULD POSE NO INSIGNIFICANT THREAT TO THE REGIME AND ITS LEADERSHIP.

17. POSSIBLE SCENARIOS IN WHICH SERIOUS OPPOSITION MAY SURFACE.

A. A SPLIT WITHIN THE REGIME'S CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP. A FEW LOCAL OBSERVERS THING THAT DIFFERENCES HAVE DEVELOPED BETWEEN TARAKI AND AMIN, ALTHOUGH, FROM OUR VIEWPOINT, NO CREDIBLE EVIDENCE OF THIS HAS, AS YET, COME TO LIGHT. NEVERTHELESS, WE PRESUME THAT CLIQUES WITHIN THE DRA LEADERSHIP CERTAINLY EXIST, AND THAT A PARTY CADRE STEEPED IN INTRIGUE AND PERSONAL MANEUVER IS NOT NECESSARILY UNIFORM IN ITS SUPPORT FOR ANY PARTICULAR LEADERSHIP. THE PARTY'S TENENTS OF "DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM" NOTWITHSTANDING, IN OUR

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VIEW, SPLITS WITHIN THE PARTY WILL BECOME EVEN MORE PROBABLY AS PRESSURES ON THE REGIME, BOTH DOMESTIC AND EXTERNAL, INCREASE. LIKEWISE, SHOULD THE PARTY NOT BE ABLE TO BROADEN ITS SUPPORT AMONG THE PEOPLE BECAUSE OF THE PERCEIVED UNPOPULARITY OF THE REGIME'S PROGRAMS OR THE DEGREE TO WHICH IT APPEARS TO HAVE SOLD OUT TO THE RUSSIANS, A "PALACE REVOLT" OUSTING THE CURRENT LEADERSHIP IN FAVOR OF ALTERNATE PARTY LOYALISTS IS NOT INCONCEIVABLE, AND MAY EVEN BE LIKELY.

Department of State

TELEGRAM

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE
ACTION MESSAGE
INFO OCT-07 100713 6A-18 005-00 014E-05 000E-02 00-01
0-01 100-10 0-03 000E-02 005-75 PA-01 SP-02
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FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AMEMBASSY BAGDAD
AMEMBASSY ISRAEL
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
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CINCPAC FOR POLSO
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THE MILITARY TO PLAY A ROLE IN ANY CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT
HERE, IT WOULD MOST LIKELY SERVE TO PROVIDE, PERHAP, A
PRIOR SUPPORT BLESSING, AN ALTERNATIVE-LEFTIST LEADERSHIP TO
THE TARAKI-AMIN TEAM. THERE PROBABLY EXIST DEDICATED LEFTISTS
IN THE PRESENT MILITARY HIERARCHY WHO, SHOULD SUPPORT FOR THE
PRESENT LEADERSHIP ERODE EVEN FURTHER, COULD PLAY SUCH A ROLE,
ALTHOUGH, ASIDE FROM DEFENSE MINISTER NATAJAN, WE CANNOT PROVIDE
SPECIFIC IDENTIFICATION AT THIS TIME.

C. AN IRANIAN-STYLE, POPULAR UPRISING LED BY MULLANS,
TO EMULATE RECENT EVENTS IN IRAN, AN AFGHAN POPULIST MOVE-
MENT WOULD REQUIRE THE EMERGENCE OF AN ORGANIZATION AND LEADERSHIP
WHICH HAS NOT BEEN DETECTED HERE SO FAR, ALTHOUGH THE
EXISTENCE OF A CLOSET NAKHONINI SOMEWHERE IN AFGHANISTAN CANNOT
BE RULED OUT. HOWEVER, AFGHANISTAN IS SO FAR BEHIND IRAN IN
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC "DEVELOPMENT" THAT MANY OF THE ADDITIONAL,
NON-RELIGIOUS PRESSURES WHICH HELPED TO BRING DOWN THE SHAH
DO NOT EXIST HERE, NOR ARE THEY LIKELY TO DEVELOP IN THE FORE-
SEEABLE FUTURE. NONETHELESS, THE VICTORY OF THE NAKHONIN
MOVEMENT COULD HAVE POTENTIALLY SIGNIFICANT REPERCUSSIONS
HERE, ESPECIALLY IF THE RECENT DOWNTURN IN AFGHAN-IRANIAN
RELATIONS CONTINUES UNABATED AND THE LATTER ARE TEMPTED TO
BECOME INVOLVED IN AFGHAN AFFAIRS.

ON THE OTHER HAND, "POLITICS OF THE MASSES" IS AN ALIEN
CONCEPT IN THIS COUNTRY, AND THE INDIVIDUAL AFGHAN ON THE
STREET IS NOT LIKELY TO RISK MUCH WITHOUT A REASONABLE ASSUR-
ANCE OF POTENTIAL SUCCESS WHICH CAN PROBABLY ONLY BE PROVIDED
BY SKILLED LEADERSHIP AND ORGANIZATION. IN THIS CONNECTION,
THE VARIOUS EXILE GROUPS HEADQUARTERED IN PESHAWAR DO NOT,
AS PRESENTLY CONSTITUTED, IN OUR ASSESSMENT, POSSESS SUFFI-
CIENT ORGANIZATION OR LEADERSHIP THAT THEIR EFFORTS WOULD
REPRESENT A SERIOUS THREAT TO THIS REGIME.

B. A TRIBAL UPRISING.

A TRADITIONAL MEANS BY WHICH AFGHANS HAVE CHANGED THEIR
GOVERNMENTS HAS GENERALLY BEEN AN UPRISING OF CERTAIN --
MOST ALWAYS PUSHTUN -- TRIBES WHO MARCHED ON KABUL AND IN-
STALLLED A DIFFERENT RULER, BUT THIS HAS NOT OCCURRED SINCE
1920. DESPITE THE ONGOING TROUBLES IN THE COUNTRYSIDE, THE
MODERN WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND COMMUNICATIONS POSSESSED BY THE
GOVERNMENT PROBABLY REDUCES THIS POSSIBILITY VERY REMOTE

AS LONG AS THE MILITARY UNITS OF THE BARUK REGIME AND THE
AFGHAN AIR FORCE REMAIN LOYAL. MANY PARTS OF AFGHANISTAN
HAVE NEVER BEEN UNDER THE COMPLETE CONTROL OF ANY CENTRAL
GOVERNMENT, AND THE DRA'S LACK OF CONTROL IN SOME AREAS IS,
THEREFORE, NOT SURPRISE, AND, THEREFORE, NOT NECESSARILY
ANY SIGN THAT THE REGIME IS ON THE VERGE OF COLLAPSE.

DESPITE THE REAL POSSIBILITY THAT THIS REGIME MAY GRAD-
UALLY LOSE CONTROL OF LARGER AREAS OF THE COUNTRYSIDE TO
INCURGENTS, CONTROL OF KABUL, THE OTHER PRINCIPAL CITIES,
AND THE MAIN LINES OF COMMUNICATION AMOUNT IN THE LARGEST SENSE
TO POLITICAL CONTROL OF THE COUNTRY. IN THIS REGARD, THE
VIOLENCE IN HERAT CONSTITUTED THE FIRST SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGE
TO THE REGIME'S AUTHORITY IN A MAJOR URBAN AREA, AND THE "LOSS"
OF THAT CITY TO ANTI-REGIME FORCES COULD HAVE DEVELOPED INTO
A POTENTIALLY SERIOUS BLOW TO THE DRA'S STABILITY. THE
REGIME'S COUNTERACTION -- BOTH LEGALLY EMPLOYING OVERWHELMING
FORCE UNDER THE CONTROL OF LOYAL MILITARY LEADERSHIP AND
CIVILIAN PARTY GUIDANCE -- DEMONSTRATED THE DRA'S WILL-
INGNESS AND ABILITY TO CRUSH OVERT OPPOSITION AND RE-ESTABLISH
GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY IN THE CITY. SOME FIGHTING IS STILL
UNDERWAY IN THE SURROUNDING PROVINCE. WE ANTICIPATE THAT
SIMILAR TACTICS WILL BE USED AGAINST FUTURE SUCH MANIFESTATIONS,
AND THEREFORE, THE POSSIBILITY OF A SUCCESSFUL TRIBAL MARCH
ON THE CAPITAL IS PROBABLY NOT IN THE CARDS UNLESS OTHER
ELEMENTS OF WEAKNESS MANIFEST THEMSELVES AND ATTRACT ATTENTION.
ONE POTENTIALLY SERIOUS VARIATION IN THIS THEME, HOWEVER,
IS THE POSSIBILITY EMERGENCE OF SCHISMS ALONG ETHNIC LINES LEAD-
ING TO UNREST BASED ON DEEPLY HELD ANTI-PUSHTUN FEELINGS ON
THE PART OF THE COUNTRY'S "SECOND-CLASS" CITIZENS IN THE
SEVERAL OTHER ETHNIC GROUPS. THERE HAS, AS YET, BEEN NO
FIRM EVIDENCE THAT THIS DEVELOPMENT IS IN THE OFFING, BUT
SOME TAJIKS, HAZARAS, AND UZBEKS MAY AT SOME POINT DECIDE TO
TRY AND TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE REGIME'S DIFFICULTIES AND SEEK
REVENGE FOR PAST PUSHTUN DISCRIMINATION, DOMINATION, AND
EXPLOITATION.

18. THE SOCIETAL ELEMENT OF THE DOMESTIC EQUATION IS CRUCIAL.
IN OUR VIEW (SHARED BY MANY OBSERVERS HERE), THE REGIME'S
NARROW BASE OF SUPPORT, ITS ALIENATION OF MANY DEVOUT AFGHAN
MUSLIMS, AND THE RELATIVE UNPOPULARITY OF SOME DRA DOMESTIC
REFORM PROGRAMS AMONG THOSE ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THEM, --
FOR EXAMPLE LARGE LANDOWNERS WHO ALSO GENERALLY REPRESENT A
PART OF THE LEADERSHIP CLASS IN THE VILLAGES -- WOULD ORDINARILY BE
ENOUGH TO BRING DOWN THE GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSENCE OF ONE
CRITICAL ELEMENT, SOVIET SUPPORT. RECENT HIGH-LEVEL SOVIET
MEDIA STATEMENTS REGARDING FOREIGN "INTERFERENCE" IN AFGHAN
INTERNAL AFFAIRS, COULD WELL BE INTERPRETED AS SOVIET DE-
CLARATION THAT MOSCOW IS COMMITTED TO THE SURVIVAL OF THE
CONCEPT OF A "PROGRESSIVE" REGIME IN KABUL, AND THAT ANY
EFFORTS TO OVERTHROW THE DRA WILL LEAD TO NOUGHT BECAUSE THE
SOVIETS WILL NOT, AS THEY HAVE ALREADY THREATENED, PERMIT
THE "TIDE OF HISTORY" TO BE REVERSED.

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PARTIAL TRANSCRIPTION - ORIGINAL FOLLOWS

[SECOND COLUMN]

THERE WILL MOST PROBABLY BE FURTHER INSURGENCIES IN THE COUNTRYSIDE AND [2 WORDS ILLEG] OF FIGHTING IN URBAN AREAS SIMILAR TO THAT WHICH OCCURED IN HERAT.

NONETHELESS, AS LONG AS THE KEY MILITARY UNITS REMAIN LOYAL TO THE KHALQI REGIME, ESPECIALLY THOSE UNITS STATIONED IN AND AROUND KABUL, AS WELL AS THE "STRIKE UNITS" USED TO SUPPRESS RESISTANCE IN HERAT AND THE INTERNAL DISCIPLINE OF THE PARTY CADRE HOLDS THIS PARTICULAR LEADERSHIP IS LIKELY TO SURVIVE FOR THE NEAR FUTURE.

SHOULD ANY UNDETECTED DISAFFECTION WITHIN THE MILITARY DEVELOP AND APPROACH SERIOUS PROPORTIONS, ALTERNATE LEADERSHIP MIGHT BE THRUST FORWARD EITHER FROM WITHIN THE PARTY OR THE MILITARY. WE HAVE LITTLE DOUBT THAT CLIQUES WITHIN THESE ORGANIZATIONS EXIST BUT THEY WILL PROBABLY NOT EMERGE UNTIL THE LEADERSHIP OF THE TARIKI-AMIN TEAM BECOMES PATENTLY COUNTERPRODUCTIVE AND THE INTERNAL SECURITY AGENCIES EITHER COOPERATE WITH THE REGIMES ENEMIES OR SIMPLY DO NOTHING IN THE EVENT OF A COUP.

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CINCPAC FOR POLAD
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19. COMMITMENT TO A CONCEPT, HOWEVER, DIFFERS FROM SUPPORT FOR SPECIFIC LEADERSHIP, AND MOSCOW, WELL AWARE OF THE DOMESTIC DIFFICULTIES OF THE TARAKI TEAM AND, AT TIMES, EVEN A BIT EMBARRASSED AT THE PLATEAU PRO-SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY LINE PURSUED BY THE DRA, MAY WARESS THE IDEAS OF BACKING AN ALTERNATIVE, LESS CONTROVERSIAL LEADERSHIP SHOULD THE SITUATION HERE DETERIORATE FURTHER. SUCH LEADERSHIP, WE PRESUME, WOULD HAVE ACCEPTABLE LEFTIST CREDENTIALS (I.E., THE LATELY PAYMENT LEADERS), BUT TO BE VIABLE IT WOULD HAVE TO BE PERCEIVED BY THE AFGHAN POPULACE AS MORE INDEPENDENT, NATIONALIST, AND LESS RADICAL ON DOMESTIC ISSUES (ESPECIALLY ISLAMI IN ORDER TO PLACATE SOME OF THE OPPOSITION), AND THEREBY FREE THE SOVIETS FROM SUCH CLOSE IDENTIFICATION WITH THE CURRENT LEADERSHIP. TO OUR KNOWLEDGE, SOVIET EXPRESSIONS OF SUPPORT FOR AFGHANISTAN HAVE NOT SPECIFICALLY ENCOMPASSED AN ENDORSEMENT OF TARAKI AND AMIN PERSONALLY, AND THE SPONGY "ESCAPE CLAUSE" LANGUAGE INCLUDED IN ARTICLE FOUR OF THE BILATERAL TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP SIGNED LAST DECEMBER'S COULD REPRESENT A SOVIET DESIRE FOR SOME FLEXIBLE MEANS TO AVOID JUST SUCH A COMMITMENT. NOTWITHSTANDING, THE AFGHANI LEADERSHIP HAS FREQUENTLY STATED ITS CONFIDENCE THAT THE USSR HAS GIVEN ASSURANCES OF SUPPORT IN CASE AFGHANISTAN IS THREATENED BY FOREIGN "INTERFERENCE" - THERE IS AN ELEMENT OF IRONY HERE, HOWEVER, BECAUSE THE MORE THIS REGIME APPEARS DEPENDENT ON THE SOVIET PROM, THE MORE UNPOPULAR IT BECOMES DOMESTICALLY FOR HAVING "SOLD OUT" AFGHAN INDEPENDENCE.

20. DESPITE THE EXTENT OF DOMESTIC OPPOSITION TO THIS REGIME, THERE IS LITTLE INFORMATION THAT ANY GROUP POSSESSES THE POWER TO NEUTRALIZE THE SOVIET FACTOR, ESPECIALLY IF MOSCOW HAS DECIDED TO EXTEND UNLIMITED SUPPORT TO A MARXIST REGIME HERE -- FOR EXAMPLE, BY SENDING TROOPS. THUS, DESPITE THE CHARACTERISTICALLY AFGHAN FORCES AT WORK ON THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL SCENE, THE ENHANCED SOVIET ROLE SINCE LAST APRIL 27 HAS GREATLY COMPLICATED THE TASK OF ANY GROUP SEEKING TO OVERTHROW THE DRA.

21. PROGNOSIS: SHORT-TERM UNREST, BUT THE DRA CAN SURVIVE. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT, FOR THE NEAR TERM, AT LEAST, DOMESTIC UNREST, OUTBREAKS OF VIOLENCE, AND GOVERNMENTAL INSTABILITY ARE TO BE EXPECTED. THE REGIME IS UNPOPULAR, AND VIEWED BY VIRTUALLY ALL AFGHANS AS COMMUNIST, GODLESS, AND TREASONOUS.

THERE WILL MOST PROBABLY BE FURTHER INSURRECTIONS IN THE COUNTRY HERE AND THERE, "ON BEHALF OF FIGHTING IN URBAN AREAS" SIMILAR TO THAT WHICH OCCURRED IN HERAT.

NOTWITHSTANDING, AS LONG AS THE NEW MILITARY UNITS REMAIN Loyal TO THE AMANI REGIME, ESPECIALLY THOSE UNITS STATIONED IN AND AROUND KABUL, AS WELL AS THE "STRIKE UNITS" USED TO SUPPRESS RESISTANCE IN HERAT, AND THE INTERNAL DISCIPLINE OF THE PARTY CADRE BODIES, THIS PARTICULAR LEADERSHIP IS LIKELY TO SURVIVE FOR THE NEAR FUTURE.

SHOULD ANY UNDETECTED DISAFFECTION WITHIN THE MILITARY DEVELOP AND APPROACH SERIOUS PROPORTIONS, ALTERNATE LEADERSHIP MIGHT BE THROST FORWARD EITHER FROM WITHIN THE PARTY OR THE MILITARY. WE HAVE LITTLE DOUBT THAT CLiques WITHIN THESE ORGANIZATIONS EXIST, BUT THEY WILL PROBABLY NOT EMERGE UNTIL THE LEADERSHIP OF THE TARAKI-AMIN TEAM BECOMES PATENTLY COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE AND THE INTERNAL SECURITY AGENCIES EITHER COOPERATE WITH THE REGIME'S ENEMIES OR SIMPLY DO NOTHING IN THE EVENT OF A COUP.

A COMPLETE OVERTHROW OF THIS REGIME, AND A POSSIBLE ESTABLISHMENT OF SOME SORT OF "ISLAMIC REPUBLIC", DO NOT SEEM PROBABLE, FIRST BECAUSE THE DRA IS NOT YET THAT WEAK, AND SECOND BECAUSE MOSCOW WOULD PROBABLY EXERT ITS CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE TO SEEN ALTERNATE LEADERSHIP WITH ACCEPTABLE "PROGRESSIVE" CREDENTIALS.

FOR THESE REASONS, WE BELIEVE THAT THE DRA FACES A ROUGH PERIOD OVER THE NEAR TERM, AND INSTABILITY COULD BECOME EXAGGERATED SHOULD THE DOMESTIC OR EXTERNAL OPPOSITION ATTAIN SOME LEVEL OF ORGANIZATION AND COORDINATION. INCREASED PRESSURE COULD CONCEIVELY RESULT IN A CHANGE IN LEADERSHIP AND, PERHAPS, A MODIFICATION IN DRA POLICIES, BUT A LEFTIST REGIME PER SE WILL PROBABLY REMAIN IN AFGHANISTAN FOR SOME TIME TO COME.

AMSTUTZ

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